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I. Overview
"Rules of origin" (ROOs) refer to the rules used by countries
to determine the country of origin of an imported good.' ROOs
are important for properly assessing tariffs, enforcing trade
remedies or quantitative restrictions, and for statistical purposes.2
For a long time, ROOs have been considered a rather technical
customs issue bearing little importance on international economic
policy.3 However, in today's global trading environment, ROOs
are more important than ever.4  Many firms engage in
manufacturing practices that take place in more than one country,
and their products represent the comparative advantages of more
than one country.' Hence, determining a single country of origin
for those products is extremely difficult, and ROOs are often at the
I See VIVIAN C. JONES & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
34524, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: RULES OF ORIGIN 1 (2012) [hereinafter CRS ROOS],
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l885&
context-keyworkplace.
2 See id. at Summary.
3 See STEFANO INAMA, RULES OF ORIGIN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (2009).
4 See CRS ROOS, supra note 1, at 12.
5 See id. at 12-14.
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center of disputes.'
One issue that deserves more scholarly attention deals with the
rules applicable to outward processing (OP). In simple terms, OP
concerns temporary exportation of goods for further
manufacturing.' As the word "temporary" indicates, the finished
goods are imported back to the home country for domestic
consumption or permanent exportation.' Firms often engage in
OP to take advantage of cheap labor in another country.9
However, OP can alter the finished product's country of origin.
For example, under the substantial transformation test used by
most countries in determining the country of origin of a good that
is not "wholly produced" in one country, a good is determined to
originate in "the last place in which it was substantially
transformed into a new and distinct article of commerce."'o For
the reasons elaborated upon later, the place of the last substantial
transformation is likely to be where OP occurs."
OP also affects the eligibility of a good for preferential tariff
treatment under a free trade agreement (FTA).'2 Most FTAs
contain preferential ROOs to determine whether a good originates
in the territory of a contracting party and is, therefore, entitled to
the duty-free treatment or other preferential tariff rates.'"
Preferential ROOs are often based on the principle of territoriality,
6 See id. at 14.
7 See Revised Kyoto Convention, Specific Annex F, ch. 2, E2/FI, Feb. 3, 2006,
99 U.N.T.S. 269.
8 See id.
9 ANATOLIY SKRIPNITCHENKO & PHILIP ABBOT, PREFERENTIAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS IN APPARENT EXPORTS FROM CARIBBEAN TO THE U.S.: A DYNAMIC
INVESTMENT APPROACH 4 (2003), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream
/21977/1/sp03sk01.pdf.
10 See CRS ROOS, supra note 1, at 3 (citation omitted).
1I See infra Section III.
12 See Paul Brenton, Preferential Rules of Origin, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 161, 168 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour
et al. eds., 2011).
13 Under an FTA, a good that does not qualify as originating in the territory of a
contracting country cannot benefit from the preferential tariff rate. However, the same
good may be determined to be originating in the territory of the same country under non-
preferential ROOs. See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 274-79 (4th ed. 2013) (describing distortions caused by NAFTA
rules of origin).
3
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which requires that "the conditions for the acquisition of
originating status be fulfilled without interruption in one or more
of the territories of the contracting parties."l4 Therefore, a product
can lose its eligibility for preferential treatment under an FTA
when it undergoes OP.'
The negative impact of OP on origin determination can be
significant if the degrees of trade liberalization between the home
country and the country in which the OP occurs differ
significantly.' 6 A good example of such a situation is found in the
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC).
The KIC is an outward processing zone (OPZ) located in the
People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) in which
companies of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have
established manufacturing plants and employ North Korean
labor." As the only current inter-Korean economic cooperation
project in the Korean Peninsula, the KIC has become a symbol of
reconciliation between the two Koreas. 8
In recent years, the South Korean government has sought to
expand the KIC to meet its inter-Korean policy goals.' 9 However,
its effort has been frustrated largely because of the unfavorable
origin determination of the products undergoing OP in the KIC. 20
Because North Korea is not a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) or other international trade blocs, products
14 See INAMA, supra note 3, at 250.
15 See Brenton, supra note 12, at 168.
16 See infra Section 111.
17 See generally Daniel J. Knudsen & William J. Moon, Recent Development,
North Korea and the Politics of International Trade Law: The Kaesong Industrial
Complex and WTO Rules of Origin, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 251, 251-55 (2010) (presenting
an overview of the KIC and the legal issues it raises).
18 See generally MARK E. MANYIN & DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
34093, THE KAESONG NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2011) [hereinafter
CRS KIC] (providing an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the KIC and
examining U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and legislation), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34093.pdf.
19 See id. at 4, 15-17.
20 See TONG-IL-BU [MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA],
GAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX GUIDE, 53-54 (2011) [hereinafter GIC GUIDE], available
at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PGOOOOOOO199&boardDatald
=BD0000223 I 00&CPOOOOOO0002800000000047Action=boardView&CPOOOOOOOOO
2_B00000000047_ViewName=board/BoardView&curNum=1.
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designated as originating in North Korea are often subject to high
tariffs. 21 Therefore, setting up a plant in the KIC is not a viable
option for many export-oriented companies.22 The South Korean
government has tried to address this issue by including so-called
"outward processing provisions" (OP provisions) in many of its
recent FTAs.23 This effort has been only partially successful.
A close observation of the South Korean experience in dealing
with the ROOs issue with respect to the KIC raises some
interesting and challenging questions that may bear great
importance not only to inter-Korean relations but also to
international economic policy. Some of these questions include:
Are the OP provisions in the FTAs between South Korea and
other countries consistent with WTO laws? Is the answer to this
question applicable to the OP provisions in other FTAs generally?
Under WTO laws, are there limitations on the amount of
discretion countries can exercise when they adopt preferential
ROOs under FTAs? If not, should there be some limitations? In
today's global trading environment, is it necessary or desirable to
derogate from the principle of territoriality when determining the
country of origin? 24  If so, to what extent and under what
standards? What are the political, economic, and legal
justifications for and against derogation?
This article contains some preliminary discussions on these
questions. However, the purpose of this article is not to provide
any definitive answers. Rather, it aims to (1) provide background
information about the KIC; (2) raise some important legal and
policy issues related to ROOs governing OP; and (3) spur much-
needed academic interest in this important field of international
trade law.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides some
historical and factual background of the KIC; Section III briefly
21 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 17, at 251; see also EUL-CHUL LIM, KAESONG
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HISTORY, PENDING ISSUES, AND OUTLOOK 202 (2007).
22 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 17, at 251.
23 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 53-54.
24 Deviating from the territoriality principle is often referred to as "derogation to
the principle of territoriality." Derogation of the Principle of Territoriality, WORLD
CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools
/comparative-study-on-preferential-rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-topics/der.aspx
(last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
summarizes some of the concepts and principles that are
fundamental in origin determination; Section IV describes how OP
affects the origin of a good; Section V explains various OP
provisions contained in South Korean FTAs and discusses some of
the challenges the South Korean government currently faces with
respect to the origin determination of Kaesong products; and
Section VI contains some preliminary discussions about the legal
and policy issues raised above.
II. The Kaesong Industrial Complex
A. General Facts
The KIC is an industrial park located in North Korea just
across the demilitarized zone that serves as the border between
South and North Korea.25 The KIC is located about 38 miles north
of Seoul and 100 miles southeast of Pyongyang 26 (see Figure 1).
As of September 2012, 123 medium-sized South Korean
companies established their manufacturing centers in an 800-acre
site in the city of Kaesong.27 Those companies employ 53,181
North Korean workers to produce mostly labor-intensive products
such as clothing and textiles (seventy-two firms), metals and
machineries (twenty-three firms), electronics (thirteen firms), and
chemicals (nine firms).28 In 2011, the facility produced over $400
million worth of goods.29
25 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 1.
26 See TONG-IL-BU [MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], PEACE
THROUGH ECONOMIC COOPERATION: GAESEONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (GIC) 1 (2012),
available at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PGOOOOOOO99&
boardDatald=BD0000222894&CP000000002 B00000000047Action=boardView&C
P0000000002 B0000000047_ViewName=board/BoardView&curNum= 1.
27 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 11.
28 See id.
29 See Saeng-san-hyeon-hwang [Production Current Status], GAE-SEONG-GONG-
EOP-JJI-GU JI-WON-JAE-DAN - KIDMAC [KAESONG INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE - KIDMAC], http://www.kidmac.com/kidmac/cogeneral.asp (last visited
Sept. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Production Current Status].
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Figure 1. The Kaesong Industrial Complex and the South-
North Korean Border 30
B. History
The KIC is the result of an initiative led by the South Korean
conglomerate Hyundai in 1998 that coincided with the "sunshine
policy" of the South Korean government. At this time, South
Korea was led by President Kim Dae-jung, who won the Nobel
Peace Prize for his efforts to improve inter-Korean relations.'
In 1998, the North Korean-born businessman and Hyundai
founder Chung Ju-yung made a historic visit to Pyongyang with
500 head of cattle as a gift to famine-stricken North Korea.3 2 At
the time, he proposed a number of economic cooperation projects,
including the KIC and the Mount Kumgang resort.33 These
30 MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41843, IMPORTS FROM
NORTH KOREA: EXISTING RULES, IMPLICATIONS OF THE KORUS FTA, AND THE KAESONG
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 7 (2011) [hereinafter CRS KORUS], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41843.pdf.
31 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 5; see also Ronald Popeski, Sunshine Policy
Failed to Change North Korea: Report, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2010, 7:36 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/18/us-korea-north-sunshine-
idUSTRE6AH12520101118.
32 See Kevin Sullivan, S. Korea Auto Tycoon Drives Cattle to North, WASHINGTON
POST, June 17, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/korea
/stories/cattle061798.htm.
33 See Mt. Kumgang and Inter-Korean Relations, THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
NORTH KOREA (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:48 PM), http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-
papers/all-briefing-papers/mt.-kumgang-and-inter-korean-relations.
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proposals were welcomed by North Korea, which was in desperate
need of hard currency.3 4 Aided by the support of the Kim Dae-
jung government, the Mount Kumgang resort opened in 1998, thus
allowing many South Korean tourists to visit the North Korean
mountain famous for its scenic beauty.35
The economic exchange shed light on the deadlocked inter-
Korean relations and, in 2000, led to the first summit between the
leaders of the two Koreas."6 That year, Hyundai Asan, a
subsidiary of the Hyundai Group, paid North Korea $500 million
for the exclusive rights to seven economic projects, including the
KIC.37 In 2002, North Korea granted a fifty-year lease for the
entire Kaesong site for $12 million.38 Although the KIC began as
a private venture, the South Korean government soon became
heavily involved in the project.3 9 In 2003, the Korea Land
Corporation, a company owned entirely by the South Korean
government, joined Hyundai Asan and became a co-developer of
the project.4 0 Construction began in 2003, and the site became
operational in 2004.41
The launch of the KIC and the second inter-Korean summit in
2007 seemed to signal a period of d6tente for the world's only
divided country.4 2 However, the d6tente ended in 2008 when a
fifty-three-year-old South Korean tourist was shot to death by a
North Korean soldier while vacationing at Mount Kumgang.4 3
34 See id.
35 See id
36 See Inter-Korean Relations, KOREA.NET (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:49 PM) [hereinafter
Inter-Korean Relations], http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Korea-at-a-Glance/Inter-
Korean-Relations.
37 See DICK K. NANTO & EMMA CHANLETr-AVEERY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32493, THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY: OVERVIEW AND POLICY ANALYSIS 17-18 (2007).
38 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 11.
39 See id. at 5-6.
40 See id. at 5. In 2009, the Korea Land Corporation merged with the Korea
National Housing Corporation and became the Korea Land and Housing Corporation.
See History, KOREA LAND & HOUSING CORPORATION, http://globalproject.1h.or.kr/01
AboutKLC/sub01 02.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
41 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 17, at 252.
42 See Inter-Korean Relations, supra note 36 ("The second inter-Korean summit
took place one year after the nuclear test, but the two Koreas were not able to solve the
nuclear conundrum, greatly concerning the people of Korea.").
43 See Leonid A. Petrov, The Politics of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation:
8 Vol. XXXIX
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This incident was followed by a series of other events that caused
inter-Korean relations to deteriorate even further." In 2009, North
Korea conducted its second nuclear test in spite of international
sanctions.45 In 2010, the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan was
sunk in the waters disputed by the two Koreas by a torpedo
launched by a North Korean submarine, leading to forty-nine
casualties.4 6 Later that year, North Korean artillery units fired
over 150 shells into and around Yeonpyeong Island, across the
disputed western sea border, killing four South Koreans.4 7 In
2012, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket that could be
converted into an intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM)
in defiance of international warnings.4 In early 2013, North
Korea conducted a third nuclear test.49
The deteriorating inter-Korean relations put a stop to virtually
all economic cooperation projects that were either started or
negotiated between the two Koreas during the period of d6tente
from 2000 to 2008.50 The KIC remains the last vestige of inter-
Korean cooperation from this period."
C. Political and Economic Significance
The fact that the KIC has survived heightened inter-Korean
tensions demonstrates its political and economic significance to
the governments of both Koreas. To the Kim Jong-un regime in
Pyongyang, the KIC is an important source of hard currency.5 2
1998-2009, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL: JAPAN Focus (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:57 PM),
http://japanfocus.org/-Leonid-Petrov/3 190.
44 See id
45 See Sang-Hun Choe, North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.htm.
46 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 2.
47 See id. at 3.
48 See Sang-Hun Choe, North Korean Missile Said to Have Military Purpose, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/world/asia/north-korean-
rocket-had-military-purpose-seoul-says.html.
49 See North Korea Conducts Third Nuclear Test, CBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 12, 2013,
1:06 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57568844/north-korea-confirms-it-
conducted-nuclear-test/.
50 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 2-5.
51 See id at 4-5.
52 See id. at 5.
9
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
According to officials of South Korea and the United States, the
North Korean government takes away approximately $20 million
per year from the salaries paid to North Korean workers in the
KIC." This amount is significant considering North Korea's poor
economy and the many economic sanctions imposed by the United
Nations and individual countries that restrict financial flows to
Pyongyang.5 4
"The purposes of the KIC as stated by South Korea have been
to develop an industrial park in which South Korean business
could manufacture products using North Korean labor, provide an
opening for North Korea to liberalize and reform its economy, and
ease tensions across the DMZ." " Therefore, the KIC is more than
just a source of inexpensive labor for the South Korean businesses.
The significance of the KIC is rooted in the pivotal role it plays in
maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula.56 It also provides a
possible beachhead that exposes tens of thousands of North
Koreans to outside influences and a market economy.
D. Operation
In the KIC, South Korean businesses manufacture products
using low-wage North Korean labor." In 2012, the minimum
wage for a North Korean worker in the KIC, agreed upon between
the two Korean governments, was $63.81 per month.5 ' This
53 See id. at Summary.
54 The U.N. Security Council has sanctioned North Korea four times. Hyung-Gon
Jeong & Hokyong Bang, An Analysis of North Korea's Principle Trade Relations, 31
ASIE VIsIoNs, July 2010, at 1, 5-6 n. 1, available at http://www.ifri.org/downloads/
asievisions32jeongbang2.pdf The United States maintains its own economic sanctions
against North Korea. See North Korea Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Aug.
13, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
pages/nkorea.aspx. Canada also maintains its own economic sanctions against North
Korea. See North Korea, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA (Sept.
6, 2012), http://www.international.gc.calsanctions/korea-coree.aspx?lang-eng&menu-id
=65.
55 CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 5.
56 See id. at Summary.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 5.
59 See 2011 nyeon-do gae-seong-gong-dan choe-jeo-im-geum 5% in-sang choe-
jong-ha-bui [Final Agreement on 5% Increase of the 2011 Minimum Wage for the
Kaesong Industrial Complex], TONG-IL-BU [MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC
10 Vol. XXXIX
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amount represents a significant increase from the 2004 rate, which
was $50 per month.6 0 Including the overtime payments and the
15% social insurance fee, the KIC manufacturers pay
approximately $100-$105 per month for each North Korean
employee."' This rate is still extremely attractive to South Korean
businesses, given that in 2006, for example, labor costs in the KIC
were only about 8% of the costs for a similar worker in a South
Korean metropolitan area.62
The labor market in the KIC cannot be characterized as a free
market. The workers are recruited exclusively by North Korea's
Central Guidance Agency on Special Zone Development, a
cabinet-level administrative body.63 This agency charges KIC
companies a commission of $17 per employee sent.' Although
KIC companies can reject any recruit if the recruit does not
demonstrate the requisite skills, they cannot freely punish or fire
incompetent workers once they have been hired. 65 Instructions
must be given through North Korean mid-level managers, and
direct scolding is prohibited.6 6 North Korean workers do not have
the right to change employers.67 The wages of the North Korean
workers are paid in dollars, or other hard currency, but the North
Korean government deducts about 45% of the wages between a
"social insurance fee" (15%) and a "sociocultural policy fee"
(30%).6' The remaining amount is paid to the workers in either
North Korean won, as converted according to the official exchange
rate, or in chits that can be exchanged for daily supplies. 69
Concerns have been raised about labor standards in the KIC and
the North Korean government's taking of a portion of the wages.70
OF KOREA], http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000197 (last
visited Oct. 2, 2013).
60 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 10.
61 See id
62 See id
63 See id. at 11.
64 See id at 12.
65 See id at 11.
66 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 11.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id at 9, 14.
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In the KIC, virtually everything other than land and labor is
supplied from and by South Korea. Most raw materials and
intermediate goods required for production in the KIC are shipped
from South Korea." The facilities required for provision of
electricity and water were built and are currently operated by the
South Korean government.7 2 Private South Korean suppliers
provide oil and gas." Companies owned by the South Korean
government treat industrial waste and wastewater.74
The South Korean government and private companies also
provide assistance for the transportation of North Korean workers
in and around the KIC." In 2005, South Korean government-
funded research institutions and non-governmental organizations
jointly provided 1,000 bicycles to the Kaesong District
Management Committee (KIDMAC) to help North Korean
workers commute to the KIC.76 Currently, there are 267 buses
operated by KIDMAC.n Many of these buses have been provided
either by the South Korean government or by the private
companies in the KIC."
71 See id. at 8. The South Korean companies in the KIC are permitted to procure
some of their manufacturing inputs locally, but in practice this rarely occurs. See id.
72 See LIM, supra note 21, at 167-69; see also GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 13-15;
CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 7.
73 See LIM, supra note 21, at 167-69; see also GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 13-15;
CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 7.
74 See LIM, supra note 21, at 167-69; see also GIC Guide, supra note 20, at 13-15;
CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 7.
75 See Hi-yeon Yu, Gae-seong-gong-dan chul-toe-geun-gil nam-han ja-jeon-geo
ssing-ssing, [Going and Returning from Work at the KIC-South Korean Bicycles 'ssing
ssing], MUN-HWA-IL-BO [MUNHWA DAILY NEWSPAPER], Sept. 26, 2005, http://www
.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2005092601012723064004; see also CRS KIC,
supra note 18, at 11.
76 See Hi-yeon Yu, supra note 75; see also CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 11.
77 Gae-seong-gong-dan hyeon-hwang [The Kaesong Industrial Complex Current
Status], TONG-IL-BU [MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA] [hereinafter
KIC Current Status], http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG
00000001 99&boardDatald=BD000220948&CPOOOOOOO002 B00000000047_Action=
boardView&CPOOOOOO0002B00000000047 ViewName=board/BoardView&curNum=
1.
78 See Yonhap News Agency, Gae-seong-gong-dan tong-geun-beo-seu dae-pok
neu-reo-nan-da [There Will Be More Commuter Buses in the Kaesong Industrial
Complex], CHOSUN LLBO [CHOSUN DAILY NEWSPAPER], Nov. 25, 2007,
http://m.chosun.com/article.html?contid=2007112500106 (indicating that the South
12 Vol. XXXIX
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KIDMAC is an administrative body established under North
Korean law, but much of its operating budget comes from
administrative fees collected from South Korean businesses in the
KIC and financial support from the Inter-Korean Cooperation
Fund set up by the South Korean government." The South
Korean government also provides KIC companies with political-
risk insurance that covers financial losses of up to 90% of their
investments in the KIC and many other financial and tax benefits
to encourage participation in the project."
The KIC is an intriguing and unique case study because it may
be the most simplistic model of an OPZ imaginable. The country
that hosts the OPZ provides virtually nothing but land and labor
while the home country provides everything else.' All raw
materials are shipped from the home country and, importantly, no
finished goods are exported directly from the OPZ.82
E. Expansion and Obstacles
According to the master plan of Hyundai Asan, the final phase
of the KIC will cover 12,600 acres (6,400 acres for the industrial
zone and 6,200 acres for the supporting zone), employ 500,000
workers, and produce $20 billion worth of goods annually."
However, such an ambitious expansion of the KIC cannot be
accomplished unless some of the major South Korean
conglomerates set up their manufacturing plants there. Currently,
all 123 firms in the KIC are medium-sized.84
Korean Government will assist in providing approximately 180 buses and build a
highway connecting Pyong-yang and Gae-seoung based on the Noth-South summit
agreement); see also Gae-seong-gong-dan-gwal-li-wi, tong-geun-beo-seu tong-hap u-
nyong [The Kaesong District Management Committee to Consolidate the Commuter Bus
Services], YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, July 14, 2011, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
buIletin/2011/07/14/0200000000AKR20110714126500043.HTM (noting that the
KIDMAC and the private companies in the KIC have agreed to consolidate bus services
for North Korean workers).
79 See LIM, supra note 21, at 118-26.
80 See CRS KIC, supra note 18, at 6.
81 See id. at 8.
82 See id.
83 Id. at 6.
84 See Production Current Status, supra note 29 (detailing the number of workers
at each of the firms).
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South Korean conglomerates would not set up any plants in the
KIC because most countries treat Kaesong products as North
Korea goods unless there is a special arrangement between South
Korea and the importing country." This is detrimental to most
export-oriented companies. When a good is determined to
originate in North Korea, it is usually subject to high tariffs. 6 In
addition, the good must be marked "Made in North Korea," which
sometimes has an adverse effect on the reputation of the good in
the foreign market."
Under South Korean law, North Korean goods are exempt
from duties because inter-Korean trade is considered "internal
trade within a nation."88 Moreover, Kaesong products can be
marked "Made in Korea" if (1) more than 60% of the registered
capital of the producer is owned by South Korean national(s); and
(2) more than 60% of the materials used in production of the good
originates in South Korea." Therefore, a vast majority of the
Kaesong products are consumed in South Korea.9 0 For example,
in 2010, only about 10% of products from the KIC were exported
to third countries after clearing customs in South Korea. 91
The problem of origin determination for Kaesong products has
85 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 53-54 (listing examples of the special
arrangements North Korea has in place with several countries).
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See Nam-buk-kkyo-ryu-hyeom-nyeo-ge gwan-han beom-nyul [Inter-Korean
Exchange and Cooperation Act], Act No. 9846, art. 12, (S. Kor.), available at
http://www.law.go.kr/1sSc.do?menuld=0&pl=&subMenu=l&nwYn=l&query=%EB%8
2%A8%EB%B6%81%EA%B5%90%EB%AS%98%ED%98%91%EB%AO%A5%EC%
97%90+%EA%B4%80%ED%95%9C+%EB%B2%95%EB%AS%AO&x=0&y=0#1iBgc
olorO (stating that a trade between North and South Korea is considered an internal trade
within a nation). The South Korean policy of exempting duty on North Korean products
may be in violation of WTO law. See generally Dukgeun Ahn, Legal Issues for Korea's
"Internal Trade" in the WTO System, in MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR GLOBALIZATION: WTO AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTs 362-76 (Wonhyuk Lim &
Ramon Torrent eds., 2005), available at http://www-dev.kdi.re.kr/kdi-eng/database/
report read05.jsp?l=1&pubno=9916 (discussing the economic and trade relationship
between North and South Korea and the legal problems raised by such in terms of WTO
obligations).
89 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 53-54.
90 See CRS KORUS, supra note 30, at 9.
91 Id. at 6.
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been one of the biggest obstacles to the expansion of the KIC.92
III. Rules of Origin
Each country has its own ROOs.93 The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not contain any specific rules
governing the determination of the country of origin.94 WTO
members are allowed to determine their own ROOs and even
maintain several sets of ROOs depending on the purposes of the
particular regulations."
When there is an FTA or other arrangement for preferential
tariff rates between two countries, the importing country may
apply a special set of ROOs to determine whether the imported
good qualifies for preferential treatment.96 These ROOs are
referred to as preferential ROOs.97 When there is no arrangement
for preferential treatment or a good imported from preference-
receiving territory fails to meet the requirement under the
applicable preferential ROOs, the importing country applies its
ordinary ROOs, which are referred to as non-preferential ROOs."
The Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO), adopted during the
Uruguay Round of GATT, establishes a program for
harmonization of non-preferential ROOs and prescribes disciplines
for the transitional period.99 The ARO also contains the Common
Declaration with Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin, which
establishes some fundamental principles that apply with respect to
non-preferential ROOs.'00 However, these principles only deal
92 Despite the ambitious master plan of Hyundai Asan, the KIC is still at the first
phase of development. See KIC Current Status, supra note 77.
93 See Technical Information on Rules of Origin, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
(Feb. 21, 2013, 11:36 PM) [hereinafter WTO Information on ROOs],
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/roi e/roi-info-e.htm.
94 See id.; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
95 See WTO Information on ROOs, supra note 93.
96 See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 275-76.
97 See id. Preferential ROOs also includes the ROOs adopted under a unilateral
preferential arrangement such as the Generalize System of Preferences (GSP). See id.;
see also INAMA, supra note 3, at 174.
98 See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 275-76.
99 See id.
100 See Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 397
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with procedural issues rather than substantive issues.o' According
to Hoekman and Kostecki, the fact that the ARO does not contain
any discipline on preferential ROOs suggests that many countries
did not want "constraints imposed on their policy freedom"
regarding "regional trade integration." 0 2
In the past, there have been two notable attempts to harmonize
ROOs.'0 3 The first attempt was in 1953 when GATT-contracting
parties considered adopting uniform ROOs but could not come to
an agreement.' 04 In 1974, a multilateral convention called the
"International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonization of Customs Producers" (Kyoto Convention) was
adopted.' The convention provides guidelines for ROOs, but not
applicable rules.'0 6  In 1999, a revised version of the Kyoto
Convention (Revised Kyoto Convention) was adopted by the
World Customs Organization.o' The Revised Kyoto Convention
went into effect in 2006.'0o However, like its predecessor, the
Revised Kyoto Convention provides only standards and
recommended practices for customs administrators. 0 9
A. Non-Preferential Rules of Origin
The ARO establishes a work program for the harmonization of
non-preferential ROOs, which was undertaken after the formation
of WTO in 1995."0 The Harmonization Work Program (HWP)
[hereinafter ARO].
101 See id.
102 TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 277.
103 See id. at 276.
104 See id
105 See id. See International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization
of Customs Procedures, May 18, 1973, 950 U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter Kyoto
Convention].
106 See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 276.
107 See Revised Kyoto Convention, Feb. 3, 2006, 99 U.N.T.S. 269, available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/conventions
/pf revised kyotoconv.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
108 See id.
109 See id.; see also Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide: Revised Kyoto
Convention (RKC), http://tfig.unece.org/contents/revised-kyoto-convention.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2013).
110 See WTO Information on ROOs, supra note 93; see also ARO, supra note 100,
at Part IV; The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
16 Vol. XXXIX
2013 RULES OF ORIGIN AND KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
should have been completed by July 1998, but due to the
complexity of the issues, negotiations remain ongoing."' "As of
March 2010, the CRO [Committee on Rules of Origin] reported
that consensus had been reached on country-of-origin rules for
1,528 products. The outgoing chair said this meant that
approximately 55% of the work of the committee had been
completed.""l2  The last "Draft Consolidated Text of Non-
preferential Rules of Origin" was issued in November 2010.' 13
Until the harmonization program is completed, the disciplines
contained in Article 2 of the ARO apply.14 However, Article 2
only contains some procedural guidelines and fundamental
principles that countries should follow in adopting their non-
preferential ROOs."s
Article 3(b) of the ARO states that upon the implementation of
the result of the HWP, WTO members will ensure:
under their rules of origin, the country to be determined as the
origin of a particular good is either the country where the good
has been wholly obtained or, when more than one country is
concerned in the production of the good, the country where the
last substantial transformation has been carried out."16
The concepts of wholly obtained product and substantial
transformation have also been used in the previous two attempts to
harmonize ROOs."' Today, these concepts are at the foundation
of both non-preferential and preferential ROOs."'
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact4 e.htm (last visited Sept. 4,
2013).
III See WTO Information on ROOs, supra note 93; see also ARO, supra note 100,
at Part IV.
112 See CRS ROOs, supra note 1, at 4.
113 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Rules of Origin, Draft
Consolidated Text of Non-Preferential Rules of Origin, G/RO/W/l 1 1/Rev.6 (Nov. 11,
2010).
114 See ARO, supra note 100, art. 2.
115 See id
116 Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).
117 See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 276.
118 See id. (explaining the Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin's use of
both concepts).
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B. Wholly Obtained Product
Under the "wholly obtained" criterion, the origin of a good
that is wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in a particular
country "shall be taken as originating in that country."" 9 This
criterion by definition cannot apply to goods containing any parts
or materials that are imported or of undetermined origin.'2 0 The
Revised Kyoto Convention enumerates a list of products that are
most compatible with this criterion.121 The list includes mineral,
agricultural products, fish, and live animals.122
C. Substantial Transformation
The principle of substantial transformation assigns the country
of origin to the last place "in which the last substantial
manufacturing or processing, deemed sufficient to give the
commodity its essential character, has been carried out." 23 The
three types of tests that are most commonly used to determine the
existence of a substantial transformation are: (a) change of tariff
classification; (b) occurrence of specified manufacturing or
processing operations; and (c) addition of prescribed minimum
percentage of value (ad valorem).124
1. Change of Tariff Classification Criterion
Under the change of tariff classification criterion-also
referred to as the "tariff-shift" test, a good is considered to have
gone through substantial transformation if it falls in a heading of a
systematic goods nomenclature different from the headings
applicable to each of the materials used in production of the
good.125  This method allows precise, predictable, and objective
determination of origin provided that both the country of
exportation and the country of importation have adopted the same
119 Kyoto Convention, Annex Dl: Annex Concerning Rules of Origin,
WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT [hereinafter Kyoto Convention DI],
http://www.washingtontradereport.com/KyotoAnnexD1.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
120 See id.
121 See Revised Kyoto Convention, supra note 107, art. 2, Specific Annex K.
122 See id.
123 Revised Kyoto Convention, supra note 107, at E3/Fl, Specific Annex K.
124 See Kyoto Convention, Annex DI, supra note 119, §§ A-C.
125 See id. § A.
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nomenclature as the basis for their respective tariffs.12 6 Today,
more than 175 countries use the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS) as the basis for their
tariffs.127
2. Manufacturing or Processing Operation Criterion
The criterion of manufacturing or processing operation confers
origin to the country in which a good undergoes a particular
processing operation that is considered sufficiently important.12 8
This method can only apply if the origin-conferring process is
clearly described in the ROOs for each product.129 Therefore, the
preparation of the ROOs may require more efforts.'30 In addition,
the origin-conferring process must constantly be reviewed and
updated to reflect developing technologies.'
3. Ad Valorem Percentage Criterion
The ad valorem percentage criterion is based on the amount of
value that is added to a good during the manufacturing or
processing in a country. 3 2  If the value added in a particular
country exceeds a specified percentage, the good acquires origin in
that country.'33 The value added also may be calculated depending
to the value of parts or materials used in production of the good.'3 4
D. Preferential Rules of Origin
Under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle in Article I of
the GATT, WTO members are prohibited from discriminating
among other WTO members in applying tariffs.' However, there
126 See id.
127 SUPPORTSH HSSUPPORT, http://harmonizedsystem.com/ (last visited Sept. 30,
2013).
128 See Kyoto Convention Annex DI, supra note 119, § B.
129 See generally Kyoto Convention, supra note 105, Specific Annex K (requiring
that ROO's be defined by the specific criteria established by international agreements).
130 See generally id. (stating numerous standards and practices needed for a ROO).
131 See Kyoto Convention Annex Dl, supra note 119, § A (specifying need to keep
a system up to date because of technological updates and economic conditions).
132 See id. § C.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See GATT, supra note 94, art. I (detailing preferential tariff rate requirements
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are some exemptions. For example, Article XXIV of the GATT
provides an exemption from the MFN principle for the free-trade
areas that meet certain requirements.13 Another exemption is
provided in the decision called "Differential and More Favourable
Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries" (Enabling Clause) adopted in 1979 by the signatories
to the GATT.13 7 The Enabling Clause allows derogations to the
MFN principle in favor of developing countries.13 8 Therefore, a
country can adopt preferential ROOs either unilaterally or under a
contractual relationship such as an FTA.13 9 Accordingly,
preferential ROOs are often classified into unilateral preferential
ROOs and contractual preferential ROOs.14 0
Preferential ROOs, whether unilateral or contractual, are
designed to ensure that tariff preferences are granted exclusively
to the goods originating in the territories of the beneficiary
countries or the members of the applicable free-trade area.'4 ' One
of the side effects of an FTA is the trade deflection that occurs
when the goods produced in the territories outside of the free-trade
area are first exported to a low-tariff member of the free-trade area
for re-exportation to a high-tariff member for ultimate sales
there.'4 2 Exporters have economic incentives to engage in trade
deflection as long as the tariff difference between the two
countries is greater than the increased transaction costs.14 3 Trade
deflection is problematic because it creates unnecessary
transaction costs and frustrates proper implementation of national
for contracting parties).
136 See id. at art. XXIV.
137 See World Trade Organization, Differential and More Favourable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, L/4903
[hereinafter Enabling Clause] (giving differential treatment to developing countries).
138 See id.
139 TRADEMARK SOUTHERN AFRICA, TRAINING MODULE ON RULES OF ORIGIN 25-26
(2013), available at http://trademarksa.org/sites/default/files/documents/01-07-2013%20
TFTA%20Rules%20of/o200rigin%20Training%2OModule%2OEnglish-O.pdf.
140 See id.
141 See INAMA, supra note 3, at 175.
142 See id. at 176; see also TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 13, at 103.
143 See TREBILCOCK, ET AL., supra note 13, at 103 (explaining how trade deflection "secures
preferential access to another more protected market within the FTA").
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tariff policies.144 Therefore, many FTAs contain provisions based
on the principle of territoriality to prevent trade deflection.'45
1. Principle of Territoriality
The principle of territoriality generally comprises two parts:
(1) the condition for acquiring originating status must be fulfilled
without interruption in the territories of the contracting parties;
and (2) when an originating good is exported from a contracting
party to a non-contracting party for additional processing and
return, it loses the originating status.'4 6
Many FTAs contain provisions that address the principle of
territoriality expressively. For example, the first two paragraphs
of Article 12 of the FTA agreed upon between South Korea and
the European Union state:
ARTICLE 12: PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY
1. Except as provided for in Article 3 and paragraph 3 of this
Article, the conditions for acquiring originating status set out in
Title II must be fulfilled without interruption in a Party.
2. Except as provided for in Article 3, where originating goods
exported from a Party to a non-party return, they must be
considered as non-originating, unless it can be demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the customs authorities that:
(a) the returning goods are the same as those exported; and
(b) they have not undergone any operation beyond that
necessary to preserve them in good condition while in that non-
party or while being exported.147
Some FTAs do not address the issue of territoriality in a single
article or chapter. For example, the principle of territoriality is
found in many different provisions in the FTA established
between South Korea and the United States (KORUS FTA).148
144 See INAMA, supra note 3, at 176 ("Strict rules of origin may substantially affect
upstream or downstream third-country producers' inputs.").
145 See id. at 175-76.
146 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and the EFTA
STATES, S. Kor.-Ice.-Liech.-Nor.-Switz., art. 12, Dec. 15, 2005 [hereinafter Korea-
EFTA FTA], available at http://www.efta.int/-/media/Documents/legal-texts/free-trade-
relations/republic-of-korea/EFTA-%20Republic%20of%20Korea%2OFree%20Trade%
20Agreement.pdf.
I47 Id.
148 See generally Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the
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KORUS FTA has two sets of preferential ROOs: (1) Annex 4-
A for textile or apparel goods; and (2) Annex 6-A for other
specified goods.14 9 The interpretative note in Article 1 of Annex
4-A requires that, for a good to acquire originating status under
Annex 4-A, "each of the non-originating materials used in the
production of the good [must undergo] an applicable change in
tariff classification . .. as a result of production occurring entirely
in the territory" of one or both of the contracting parties before
other requirements are met.' Similarly, Article 6.1 of KORUS
FTA provides that, for a good to acquire originating status under
Annex 6-A, the good must be "produced entirely in the territory"
of one or both of the contracting parties before other requirements
are satisfied.'"' Because Article 1.4 of KORUS FTA defines the
territory of South Korea as the area over which South Korea
exercises sovereignty, these provisions effectively preclude
application of preferential tariff rates from products undergoing
OP.152
The principle of territoriality is also embedded in Article 6.13
of KORUS FTA, which states that "a good shall not be considered
to be an originating good if the good ... undergoes subsequent
production or any other operation outside the territories of the
[contracting parties], other than unloading, reloading, or any other
operation necessary to preserve the good in good condition." 53
Although this provision supposedly sets out the direct transport
rule that ensures that the goods arriving in the importing country
are same as the goods leaving the exporting country, it is
substantially identical to the second prong of the territoriality
principle.154
United States of America, S. Kor.-U.S., June 20, 2007, [hereinafter KORUS FTA],
available at http://www.fta.go.kr/korus/pds/korus-list en.html (establishing the rights
the contracting parties have as sovereign states to deal with trade within their territories).
149 Id. at Annex 4-A, Annex 6-A.
150 Id. art. 1, Annex 4-A (emphasis added).
151 Id. art. 6.1 (emphasis added).
152 Id. art. 1.4.
153 Id. art. 6.13.
154 See Jong Bum Kim, Territoriality Principle under Preferential Rules of Origin
6 (KDI Sch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-12, 2007), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1020880; see also Revised Kyoto
Convention, supra note 107, at art. 12, Specific Annex K.
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E. Indirect Materials
Indirect materials refer to the materials such as fuel, energy,
tools, machinery, and chemicals that are used in the production of
a good but not physically incorporated into the good.' 5 Under
both preferential ROOs and non-preferential ROOs, the origins of
indirect materials are generally disregarded in determination of the
origin of the finished good.'"' Therefore, in determining the origin
of Kaesong products, almost no consideration is given to the fact
that most indirect materials used in the KIC are supplied from and
by South Korea.'5 7
IV. Outward Processing
A. Origin Determination under Non-Preferential Rules of
Origin
It is difficult to conduct a comprehensive study on how OP
affects the origin determination of a good under non-preferential
ROOs because every country has a different set of non-preferential
ROOs that often are not codified.'"' However, it is not difficult to
guess why a product undergoing OP often loses its originating
status.
Under the change of tariff classification criterion, substantial
transformation is deemed to have occurred if the final product falls
in a tariff classification that is different from the tariff
classifications of all non-originating materials, parts, and
components that are used in production of the good.'5 9 This
criterion assumes that the place in which the change of tariff
classifications occurs is the origin of the final product.'60
155 See KORUS FTA, supra note 148, at art. 6.22.
156 See id. at art. 6.12.
157 See generally id. (stating that indirect material does not affect a determination of
the origin of a good).
158 For example, there is no specific U.S. statute that provides an overall definition
of rules or origin. Instead, U.S. Customs and Boarder Protection (CBP) relies on a body
of court decisions, CBP regulations, and agency interpretations to determine the country
of origin of an imported good. See CRS ROOs, supra note 1, at 2.
159 See Kyoto Convention Annex DI, supra note 119, § A (explaining how a
change in tariff nomenclature or classification can lead to a substantial transformation).
160 See A Change in Tariff Classification, EXPORT.GOv (Apr. 25, 2012, 10:25 AM),
http://export.gov/FTA/korea/egmain_048792.asp ("This transformation is defined by
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Therefore, a good undergoing OP will lose its originating status
unless the OP is limited to minor manufacturing or processing that
does not change the tariff classification of the good.16 1
The criterion of manufacturing or processing operation also
contains a strong territoriality requirement, because the origin-
conferring operations must occur within the territory of the
originating country.16 2 This limits the type of operations that can
take place in an OPZ.
OP has the least effect on the country of origin of a good under
the ad valorem percentage criterion because the criterion is based
on the amount of value that is added to the good during
manufacturing or processing.163  The value added is often
calculated by reference to the value of materials and components
used in production of the good.'64 Therefore, a good will not lose
its originating status during OP as long as it maintains a certain
percentage of originating materials, parts, and components.16
Today, many countries favor the change of tariff classification
criterion because: (1) it provides objective and precise methods for
describing the kind of substantial transformation that confers
origin; and (2) most countries have adopted the HS as their basis
for tariffs.166 As a result, a major processing in an OPZ is likely to
alter the origin of a good.167
B. Origin Determination under Preferential Rules of Origin
Preferential ROOs are usually based on the principle of
the tariff-shift rule in terms of a change in the HS Code of the input to the HS code of the
final product.").
161 See Principle of Territoriality, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-
preferential-rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-topics/ter.aspx (last visited Oct. 2,
2013) (explaining the principle of territoriality requires that all originating conferring
operations must be fulfilled within the territories of the contracting parties).
162 See id
163 See Kyoto Convention Annex DI, supra note 119, at sec. C.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See CRS ROOs, supra note 1, at 5.
167 See generally id. (demonstrating that a change in tariff classification, which
outward processing would cause, will in turn alter the origin of a good).
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territoriality.'68 Therefore, products undergoing OP are usually not
eligible for preferential treatment unless there is a special
arrangement. There are many ways a special arrangement can be
made. 9
1. Unilateral Arrangement
Unilateral arrangements conferring preferential tariff treatment
to products undergoing OP are rare, because there is no clear legal
basis for such arrangements under the GATT.o The Qualifying
Industrial Zone (QIZ) initiative adopted by the United States is
one of these rare examples. The QIZ initiative allows preferential
tariff treatment to the products undergoing OP in the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip, and other qualifying industrial zones in Jordan and
Egypt as long as those products contain inputs from Israel."' The
Israeli settlements located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are
at the heart of legal and political disputes between Israel, the
Palestinians, and the European Union.'72 According to the United
States, the QIZ initiative was adopted to support the peace process
in the Middle East."' Interestingly, although the QIZ initiative
168 See INAMA,supra note 3, at 250.
169 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, J 134-41, WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr. 7, 2004) (explaining certain ways tariff preferences are granted in the EU).
170 Article XXIV of the GATT provides an exemption from the MFN principle for
GATT-compliant customs unions or free trade areas. The Enabling Clause permits
derogation from the MFN principle with respect to preferential tariff treatment in favor
of developing countries. However, under the Enabling Clause, tariff preferences granted
by developed countries must not discriminate among developing countries, except for the
situation where more generous preferences are granted to all least-developed countries.
Therefore, the Enabling Clause may be used as a basis for granting preferential treatment
to the products originating in a particular outward processing zone. See STEFAN
TANGERMANN, THE FUTURE OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE CURRENT ROUND OF WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE, ch. 6
(Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N. 2002), available at http://www.fao.org
/docrep/004/Y2732E/y2732e08.htm.
171 See Kim, supra note 154, at 17.
172 See Moshe Hirsch, Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments?
The European Union Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 572, 586 (2003).
173 See INT'L TRADE ADMIN. OFFICE OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL (OTEXA),
QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONE (QIZ), http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgilfta.nsf/7a9d3143265
673ee85257a0700667a6f/196ed79f4f79ac0085257a070066961d (last visited Oct. 2,
2013).
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was adopted by amending the US-Israel Free Trade Area
Implementation Act of 1985, it is not part of the US-Israel FTA.17 4
Also, the QIZ initiative is different from OP provisions contained
in an FTA because: (1) it allows inclusion of the value of the
materials produced in the QIZ as well as the direct cost of
processing operations performed in the QIZ in the qualifying value
or costs; and (2) the finished products can be shipped directly from
the QIZ.'75
2. Bilateral Arrangement
FTAs often contain provisions designed to relax the strict
requirements of the territoriality principle.'7 6
i. Outward Processing Provisions
OP provisions generally consist of two parts: (1) exemptions
from the territoriality principle for enumerated products; and (2)
description of the origin-conferring requirements under ad
valorem percentage criteria for the enumerated products.'7 7 The
second part is crucial because OP provisions do not work with
other criteria for determining substantial transformations.'
ii. Tolerance (De Minimis) Rules
Tolerance rules, often called de minimis rules or general OP
provisions, allow a certain percentage of non-originating materials
to be used in the production of a good without affecting the origin
of the good.'7 9 Some tolerance rules apply to all products
regardless of the criterion used for determination of substantial
transformation." 0 However, the majority of tolerance rules only
174 See Norio Komuro, FTA Outward Processing at the Crossroads, 4 J. WORLD
TRADE 797, 812-14 (2009).
175 See id. at 813.
176 See Ribeiro de Almeida & Alberto Francisco, The Trips Agreement, The
Bilateral Agreements Concerning Geographical Indications and the Philosophy of the
WTO, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 150, 156 (2005), available at http://www.apdi.pt/
pdflOMC%20TRIPS%2ORibeiro%20de%20Almeida.pdf ("[B]ilateral agreements maybe
[sic] a good tool to supersede the territoriality principle.").
177 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 802; see also infra Section V(A).
178 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 802.
179 See Brenton, supra note 12, at 161, 168.
180 See id.; see also infra Section V(A).
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apply with respect to the change of tariff classification criterion.'
iii. Cumulation
Cumulation rules allow producers to use materials imported
from another country and still qualify for preferential tariff
treatment. 18 2 There are three types of cumulation: (1) bilateral
cumulation, (2) diagonal cumulation, and (3) full cumulation.183
Under the bilateral cumulation rule, materials originating in the
territory of any contracting party can be used to meet the domestic
content requirement under the FTA.18 4  Diagonal cumulation
allows producers to use materials originating in a specified
region.'"" For example, under the FTA established between the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Turkey, any
materials originating in the territory of a member of the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area, even if the member is not a
contracting party to the EFTA-Turkey FTA, can be used to meet
the domestic content requirement.' Under the full cumulation
rule, producers can use any materials imported from a specified
region even if the materials are not determined to be originating in
that region.'
V. Origin Determination of Kaesong Products
A. Current Status
According to the South Korean government, other countries
treat Kaesong products as North Korean products unless there is a
special arrangement."' Therefore, the South Korean government
has been trying to include OP provisions in its FTAs so that its
trade partners treat Kaesong products as South Korean products.'89
181 See Brenton, supra note 12, at 168.
182 See id at 166-68.
183 See id
184 See id
185 See id
186 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 805.
187 See Brenton, supra note 12, at 166-68.
188 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 53 (listing examples of special arrangements
South Korean has in place with other countries).
189 Id.
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As of January 2013, South Korea has entered into ten FTAs.' 90
Eight of them are in force (the United States, the European Union,
EFTA, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN],
Chile, Singapore, India and Peru) and two are ready for
implementation (Turkey and Colombia). 9' Based on the 2011
numbers, 37.8% of all South Korean exports are now covered
under an FTA.192 The percentage of total South Korean exports to
each trade partner or bloc is set out in Table 1.
Table 1. Exports
(2011)193
from South Korea to FTA Trade Partners
Trade Partner The KIC Percentage of
Total Export
ASEAN Included 12.9%
(including
Singapore)
India Included 2.3%_
EFTAt Included 0.3%
Peru Included 0.3%'
Colombiat Included 0.3%'
Total (the KIC included) 16.1%
United States TBD 10.2%1
European Union TBD 10.2%1
Chile No provision 0.4%'
Turkey TBD 0.9%_
190 See FTA Status of ROK, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA [hereinafter FTA Staus of ROK] http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/
policy/ftalstatus/overview/index.jsp?menu=m_20_80_10&tabmenu=t I (last visited Oct.
2,2013).
191 Id.
192 This number is calculated by the author based on the information obtained from
the WTO Trade Policy Review on the Republic of Korea and the United Nations
Comtrade database. See Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, Trade
Policy Review: Republic of Korea, WT/TPR/S/268 (Aug. 15, 2012); UNITED NATIONS
COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/ (last visited Oct.2, 2013).
193 This table was created by the author using the information obtained from the
South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the WTO Trade Policy Review on the
Republic of Korea, and the United Nations Comtrade database. See supra notes 190 and
192.
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Total (the KIC not included) 21.7 %
37.8%
ASEAN consists of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
t EFTA consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
The Korea-Columbia FTA is not in effect yet.
& Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review:
Republic ofKorea, WT/TPR/S/268 (Aug. 15, 2012), at 167.
Calculated from the numbers obtained from UNSD Comtrade database
(http://comtrade.un.org/db/).
Six of the ten South Korean FTAs provide preferential tariff
treatment to at least some Kaesong products.1 94 These FTAs
(EFTA, ASEAN, Singapore, India, Peru, and Colombia) cover
approximately 16.1% of the total exports from South Korea.' 5 In
other FTAs (the United States, the European Union, Chile, and
Turkey), the country-of-origin issue is not settled for Kaesong
products. 19 6 The Korea-Chile FTA does not contain any provision
about OP because it was adopted before the planning of the
KIC.' 97 Some FTAs (the United States, the European Union, and
Turkey) provide that a special committee be set up for discussion
of country-of-origin issues in relation to the KIC and other OPZs
that might be established in the future."
The FTA providing the most favorable treatment to Kaesong
products is the Korea-Singapore FTA (KSFTA).' 99 It contains a
list of 4,625 products at the HS six-digit level that are eligible for
duty-free treatment as long as they are "imported into the territory
of Singapore from the territory of Korea." 200  This list is
194 The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website provides the text of the
ten South Korean FTAs. The author examined the text of all those FTAs and compared
the provisions contained in those agreements that related to outward processing. See
FTA Status ofROK, supra note 190.
195 Id
196 Id
197 Id
198 See id.
199 Id
200 Hye-Min Bak, Rules of Origin on Outward Processing Under FTA's:
Implications for Korea, 12(2) KOREA REV. OF INT. STUD. 70 (2009). See Free Trade
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of
the Republic of Singapore, S. Kor.-Sing., art 4.3, 4.9, Aug. 4, 2005 [hereinafter KSFTA],
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/kr-sg/trt krsg.pdf.
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impressively inclusive considering that the total number of
products at the HS six-digit level is approximately 5,640.201 The
arrangement also allows full cumulation with respect to the
covered products.2 02 Section 2.2 of Annex 4A of the KSFTA
states that it is "understood" that the covered products include the
products manufactured in the "the Gaesong Industrial Complex
and other industrial zones on the Korean Peninsula."2 0 3
KSFTA also contains more restrictive OP provisions with
respect to an additional 135 products at the HS ten-digit level.204
Some of the origin-conferring requirements under these provisions
include: (1) "the total value of non-originating inputs does not
exceed 40% of the customs value of the final good"; (2) the value
of originating materials is not less than 45% of the customs value
of the final good; (3) the producer of the good remains the same
before and after the OP; and (4) "the last process of production
takes place in the territory of a contracting party."20 5
KSFTA provides unusually favorable treatment to Kaesong
products because Singapore has a zero-tariff policy on "almost
every import."2 06 Other countries, however, have not offered such
favorable treatment to Kaesong products.207
The FTA concluded between South Korea and EFTA, which
consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland (K-
EFTA FTA), provides OP provisions for some 267 products at the
HS six-digit level. 2 08  The origin-conferring requirements under
these provisions are: (1) "the total value of non-originating input
does not exceed 40% of the ex-works price of the final product";
and (2) "the value of originating materials is not less than 60% of
the total value of the materials use in the production of the
good." 20 9 Article 1(e) of Annex 1 of the K-EFTA FTA defines ex-
201 See Bak, supra note 200, at 70.
202 See KSFTA, supra note 200, art 4.3, 4.9.
203 Id. art. 2.2, Annex 4B: Originating Goods Referred to in Article 4.3, available at
http://www.commonlii.org/sg/other/treaties/2005/2/KSFTAAnnex-4B.html.
204 See KSFTA, supra note 200, art 4.4; see also Bak, supra note 200, at 71; GIC
GUIDE, supra note 20, at 54.
205 KSFTA, supra note 200, art. 4.4(1).
206 Bak, supra note 200, at 80; KSFTA, supra note 200, art. 4.4(1).
207 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 17, at 252 (2010).
208 See Bak, supra note 200, at 79; see also GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 54.
209 See Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 146, art. 2, app. 4, Annex 1.
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works price as:
the price paid or payable for the product ex-works to the
manufacturer in a [contracting party] in whose undertaking the
last working or processing is carried out, provided the price
includes the value of all the materials used, minus any internal
taxes returned or repaid when the product obtained is
exported.210
In addition to the OP provisions, KEFTA provides a tolerance
rule that allows a good to maintain its originating status as long as:
(1) the total value added during OP "does not exceed 10% of the
ex-works price of the final product"; and (2) the good has been
either wholly obtained or processed beyond specified operations in
the territory of a contracting party before being exported to
OPZ. 211
The OP provisions contained in other FTAs (ASEAN, India,
Peru, and Colombia) cover between 100 and 108 products at the
HS six-digit level.212 These provisions generally allow preferential
treatment to a good undergoing OP as long as the value added
during OP does not exceed 40% of the value of the good. 213 Each
FTA provides slightly different methods of calculating the value
of a good.2 14 All of those FTAs contain de minimis rules with
respect to the application of the tariff-shift test, allowing a small
amount of non-originating materials to be used without affecting
the originating status of the good.2 15 Many of the FTAs explicitly
mention the KIC or limit the application of the OP provisions to
Kaesong products. For example, the South Korean FTAs with
ASEAN and India expressly limit the application of the OP
provisions to Kaesong products.2 16 Under the South Korean FTAs
210 Id. at art. 1(e), Annex 1.
211 Id. at art. 1, app. 4, Annex 1.
212 See supra note 192; see also Bak, supra note 200, at 82; GIC GUIDE, supra note
20, at 54.
213 See supra note 192; see also Bak, supra note 200, at 81-82.
214 See supra note 192; see also Bak, supra note 200, at 60-78; infra Table 2.
215 See supra note 192; see also Bak, supra note 200, at 60-78; infra Table 2.
216 See Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of
Korea and the Republic of India, S. Kor.-India, app. 3-B-1, Aug. 7, 2009 [hereinafter
Korea-India FTA], available at http://commerce.nic.in/trade/INDIA%20KOREA
%20CEPA%202009.pdf; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation among the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Member Countries
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with Columbia and Peru, "operations and processes performed in
the Gaeseong Industrial Complex located in North Korea" on
materials exported from South Korea are deemed to have been
performed in South Korea.2 17 Table 2 summarizes various OP
provisions and tolerance rules in South Korean FTAs.
Table 2. Preferential Treatment of the Kaesong products
under Korean FTAs2 18
Trade Tolerance (De Minimis) OP Arrangement
Partner Rule No Domestic Domestic
Content Content
Requirement Requirement
(Permitted OP
value)
ASEAN For tariff-shift test, non- None 100 products at
originating materials are the HS six-digit
allowed if they are less than level
10% of the FOB value* and (Up to 40% of
10% of the total weight of the FOB value)
the good.
Singapore For tariff-shift test, non- 4,625 135 products at
originating materials are products at the HS ten-digit
allowed if they are less than the HS six- level
10% of the total customs digit level (Up to 40% of
value.t the customs
value)
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, S. Kor.-ASEAN, Dec. 13, 2005, Letter of
Understanding, Annex 3, available at http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/korasean.
asp?country?idx=14.
217 See Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of
Peru, S. Kor.-Peru, art. 1, ann. 3B, Mar. 21, 2011 [hereinafter Korea-Peru FTA],
available at http://fta.customs.go.kr/html/kor/ _down/Kor-PE-00-Total.pdf; Free Trade
Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Colombia, S. Kor.-
Colom., art. 1, Annex 3.B, Feb. 21, 2013 [hereinafter Korea-Colombia FTA], available
at http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/ftakorea/colombia/'-gTm H I O %20FTA%20xyik x c
(od =t-).pdf.
218 This table was created by the author based on the information obtained from the
Gaesong Industrial Complex Guide and the text of individual South Korean FTA. See
GIC GUIDE supra note 20, at 54. See also supra note 192.
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FOB value means the price actually paid or payable to the exporter for a
good when the good is loaded onto the carrier at the named port of
exportation, including the cost of the good and all costs necessary to bring
the good to the carrier.
Customs value means the price actually paid or payable for a good or
material with respect to a transaction of the seller of the good, pursuant to
the principles of Article 1 of the Customs Valuation Agreement, adjusted
in accordance with Article 8 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.
Ex-works price means the price paid or payable for the product ex-works
to the manufacturer, provided the price includes the value of all the
materials used, minus any internal taxes returned or repaid when the
product obtained is exported.
This value is determined in accordance with the Customs Valuation
Agreement.
Adjusted value means the FOB value of the good determined pursuant to
the Customs Valuation Agreement.
Not implemented yet.
India For tariff-shift test, non- None 108 products at
originating materials are the HS six-digit
allowed if they are less than level
10% of the FOB value or up (Up to 40% of
to 7% the total weight of the the total value of
good. the materials
used)
EFTA Non-originating materials None 267 products at
and OP are allowed up to the HS six-digit
10% of the ex-works price level
of the good. (Up to 40% of
For tariff-shift test, non- the ex-works
originating materials are price)
allowed if they are less than
10% of the ex-works price
and 10% of the total weight
of the good.
Peru For tariff-shift test, non- None 100 products at
originating materials are the HS six-digit
allowed if they are less than level
10% of the valuet of the (Up to 40% of
good. the FOB price of
ofth theoood
Colombia For tariff-shift test, non- None 100 products at
originating materials are the HS six-digit
allowed if they are less than level
10% of the adjusted value (Up to 40% of
of the good. the FOB price of
the good)
t
§
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Note: Customs Valuation Agreement means the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, contained in Annex lA to the WTO Agreement.
A majority of South Korean exports is still not covered by any
FTA.21 9 The countries that do not have any FTA with South Korea
apply their non-preferential ROOs to determine the country of
origin of Kaesong products.2 20 Because the standard under non-
preferential ROOs differs from product to product, it is difficult to
generalize how Kaesong products are treated. However, according
to the South Korean government, most Kaesong products are
treated as originating from North Korea unless they are covered
under an FTA.221 North Korea has special trade relations with
China and Russia.222 China applies MFN tariff rates to North
Korean products.223 However, other countries, such as Japan,
apply non-MFN tariff rates to Kaesong products.224
Table 3. Export from South Korea to Non-FTA Partners
(2011)225
Trade Partner Percentage of Total Export
China 24.2%
Japan 7.1%
Brazil 2.1%
Russia 1.9%
Mexico 1.8%
Australia 1.5%
Others 23.6%t
219 See infra Table 3.
220 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 17, at 253.
221 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 53.
222 See Jeong & Bang, supra note 54, at 5.
223 Gae-seong-gong-dan je-pu-mui hae-oe pal-lo: Gae-do-guk si-jang-ui ui-ui-wa
jin-chul bang-an [Overseas Sales of Kaesong Products: Significance of the Markets in
Developing Countries and Appropriate Tactics], KOREA TRADE-INVESTMENT PROMOTION
AGENCY 14 (2007) (on file with the author).
224 See GIC GUIDE, supra note 20, at 53.
225 This table is created by the author using the information obtained from the WTO
Trade Policy Review on the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Comtrade
database. See supra note 192.
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TOTAL 62.2%t
t Calculated using the number from Table 2
B. Remaining Issues
So far, South Korea has entered into ten FTAs with forty-
seven countries that are responsible for approximately 37.8% of its
total exports.226 There are still many other countries with which
South Korea has not entered into any preferential trade
agreements. Among them are South Korea's two most important
trade partners-China and Japan. In 2011, these two countries
were responsible for more than 30% of the total exports from
South Korea.22 7 Hence, preferential treatment of Kaesong
products under FTAs with those two countries is crucial for
ensuring the success of the KIC. Fortunately for South Korea,
China has reportedly agreed to allow preferential treatment on the
Kaesong products under its future FTA with South Korea.22 8
There are also challenges concerning existing FTAs. For
example, many FTAs allow preferential treatment to only about
100 products at the HS six-digit level.229  In 2007, there were
already 232 products at the HS six-digit level that are produced or
are being planned in the KIC.2 30 Since then, the KIC has grown to
more than twice its size in the number of employees and the value
of total production.23 ' Considering the large number of products
that are produced and will be produced in the KIC, the South
Korean government may need to seek renegotiation on the
coverage of the existing OP provisions in the near future.
The "OP committees" provide another challenge. Three South
Korean FTAs (the United States, the European Union, and
Turkey) contain provisions for establishing a "Committee on
226 See FTA Status ofROK, supra note 190.
227 See supra Table 3.
228 See FTA with China May Allow Preferential Tariffs on Kaesong-Made Goods,
YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 6, 2012), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/
2012/09/06/95/0502000000AEN20120906001500320F.HTML.
229 See supra Table 2.
230 See Han-ASEAN FTA Ju-yo-nae-yong [Korea-ASEAN FTA Summary], OAE-
GYO-TONG-SANG-BU [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA] 36 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013), available at http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/
flakorealasean/KOR-ASEANFTA summary.pdf
231 See Production Current Status, supra note 29.
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Outward Processing Zones on the Korean Peninsula" that meets at
least once a year beginning on the first anniversary of the
implementation of the FTA.232 The committee is composed of
officials from both parties and it discusses "whether the conditions
of the Korean Peninsula are appropriate for further economic
development through the establishment and development of
outward processing zones."2 33 The committee then determines
whether any such OPZ has met the criteria established by the
committee and sets a "maximum threshold for the value of total
input of the originating final good that may be added within the
[OPZ]."234
VI. Legal and Policy Issues
A. Legality of the Outward Processing Provisions
Although there are many FTAs that allow preferential tariff
treatment to products undergoing OP, the legality of OP provisions
is questionable.2 35 OP provisions may violate the MFN principle
in Article I of GATT, which provides that, with respect to trade
regulations, "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties."23 6
Article XXIV:5(b) of GATT creates an exemption from the
MFN principle for FTAs by stating that nothing in GATT shall
prevent the formation of a free-trade area provided that the duties
and other regulations of commerce (ORCs) maintained after the
adoption of the free-trade area are not higher or more restrictive
than the corresponding duties and ORCs that were already in
place. 2 37 Article XXIV:8(b) defines a free-trade area as "a group
232 Troy Stangarone, Korea-EU FTA Represents a Challenge for the United States,
KOREA ECON. INST. OF AMERICA (Oct. 24, 2009), available at http://keia.org/sites/
default/files/publications/09November.pdf; see also KORUS FTA, supra note 148,
Annex 22-B (providing an example of such a committee).
233 KORUS FTA, supra note 148, Annex 22-B.
234 Id.
235 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 805.
236 See id. at 842-43; see also GATT, supra note 94, art. I (emphasis added).
237 GATT, supra note 94, art. XXIV, 5(b) (emphasis added).
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of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce .. . are eliminated on
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories."2 38
Komuro points out that although Article XXIV clearly
provides an exemption from the MFN obligation for those goods
traded under an FTA, it is unclear whether Article XXIV may be
used to legitimize discrimination among non-parties to the FTA.239
In other words, a country may be found in violation of its
obligations under WTO laws if it grants an advantage under an
FTA to a product originating in a third-party country if the same
advantage is not extended to the like products originating in all
WTO members. 24 0 Komuro says that this may be true when an OP
arrangement benefits de jure or de facto specified third-party
countries. 241' However, this position is contentious.
Article XXIV states that the MFN principle does not prevent
countries from entering into FTAs that offer preferential treatment
to a product originating in the territories of the contracting
parties.2 42  This means that OP provisions violate the MFN
principle if they allow preferential treatment to a product not
originating in the territories of the contracting parties.2 43
However, it is the importing country that determines the origin of
a good, and there is very little discipline on preferential ROOs. 244
According to Kim, preferential ROOs are merely an "operational
structure" of an FTA.2 45 Therefore, OP provisions should not be
deemed "rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation" providing an advantage to products originating in a
country hosting an OPZ. 24 6 In other words, OP provisions do not
grant an advantage to products originating in a third-party country
238 Id. art. XXIV:8(b) (emphasis added).
239 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 842-43.
240 See Donald McRae, 7 MFN in the GA 7T and the WTO, ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L
HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 1 (2012).
241 Komuro, supra note 174, at 842-43.
242 See GATT, supra note 94, art. XXIV.
243 See McRae, supra note 240 (emphasis added).
244 See supra Section III.
245 See Kim, supra note 154, at 25.
246 Id. (quoting GATT, supra note 94, art. I).
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because the products that are entitled to preferential treatment
under OP provisions are determined by the importing countries to
be originating in the territories of the contracting parties.247 The
problem with this argument is that it assumes there is virtually no
limit to what countries are allowed to do with preferential ROOs.
Therefore, to determine whether the OP provisions contained in
the South Korean FTAs are consistent with WTO laws, WTO
discipline on preferential ROOs must be analyzed.
B. Discipline on Preferential ROOs
Currently, there are no binding multilateral rules on
preferential ROOs.248 Article 1(1) of the ARO expressly limits its
scope to ROOs "not related to contractual or autonomous trade
regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond
the application of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994."249
Annex II of ARO provides that the general principles applicable to
non-preferential ROOs also apply to preferential ROOs.
Principles such as transparency, positive standards, administrative
assessments, judicial review, non-retroactivity of changes, and
confidentiality also apply to preferential ROOs.250 However, these
principles merely represent the "best endeavor" commitments by
the member states with respect to the procedures governing origin
determination, not the substance of preferential ROOs."'
The exclusion of preferential ROOs in the ARO indicates that
countries are allowed to exercise some discretion with respect to
the preferential ROOs they adopt under an FTA.25 2 In Turkey-
Textiles, the Appellate Body recognized the lack of discipline on
preferential ROOs and acknowledged their role in preventing trade
deflection. 253 However, it is not clear if there are any limits to the
amount of discretion a country can exercise in designing
247 See Kim, supra note 154, at 25.
248 See INAMA, supra note 3, at 174.
249 See ARO, supra note 100, art. 1(1).
250 Id. at Annex 11.
251 See INAMA, supra note 3, at 23.
252 See generally ARO, supra note 100 (defining ROOs and dictating how they are
to be applied without mentioning preferential ROOs).
253 See Appellate Body Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, 62, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey-Textiles
ABR].
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preferential ROOs.
A clue to answering this question may be found in the
definitions of ORC and other restrictive regulations of commerce
(ORRCs) in Article XXIV. The panel in Turkey-Textiles stated
that "the ordinary meaning of the terms other regulations of
commerce could be understood to include any regulation having
an impact on trade."25 4 Rivas argues that this implies that ORCs
include preferential ROOs. 255 If his position is taken as true,
ORRC may also include preferential ROOs, because it is clear
from the text of Article XXIV that ORRCs are a subset of
ORCs. 256 If preferential ROOs constitute ORRCs, the definition of
a free-trade area under Article XXIV:8(b) requires that the trade
restriction created by preferential ROOs be eliminated on
"substantially all the trade between constituent territories."25 7
In Turkey-Textiles, the appellate panel noted that
"substantially all the trade" is not the same as all the trade.258
Therefore, countries have some flexibility in liberalizing their
trade under an FTA in accordance with Article XXIV:8. 25 9
However, the appellate panel also noted that "substantially all the
trade" is something considerably more than merely some of the
trade.260 in other words, preferential ROOs that restrict too great a
portion of trade can violate WTO laws. 261 This means that there is
WTO discipline on preferential ROOs.26 2 Therefore, it may also
be argued that preferential ROOs that do not allow any OP should
be considered "too restrictive" under Article XXIV:8.
Although currently there is no WTO jurisprudence clarifying
the interaction between ROOs and the disciplines in Article XXIV,
254 See Panel Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, % 9.105 & 9.120, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey-Textiles
PR] (emphasis added).
255 See Jose Antonio Rivas, Do Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements Comply
with Article XXIV GA TT?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL
SYSTEM 153-154 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds. 2006).
256 See GATT, supra note 94, art. XXIV.
257 See id art. XXIV:8(b)
258 See Turkey-Textiles ABR, supra note 253, 48.
259 See id.
260 Id.
261 See id 48-50.
262 See id.
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there is a good basis for arguing that Article XXIV imposes some
restrictions on preferential ROOs that are too restrictive.
However, the question still remains open for preferential ROOs
that are potentially "too inclusive," such as the OP provisions
contained in the South Korean FTAs.
As Komuro points out, the MFN principle provides a basis for
arguing that preferential ROOs under an FTA cannot be so
inclusive as to confer preferential treatment to the products
originating in a third-party country unless the same preferential
treatment is extended to the like products originating in other
third-party countries.263 Kim recognizes the discriminatory nature
of OP provisions and argues that although the ARO does not
discipline preferential ROOs, they should reflect the "last
substantial manufacturing or processing rule" so that OP
provisions are not used to confer originating status to the products
that are in fact originating in the country OP occurs.2 64 He also
argues that OP provisions that reflect the existing manufacturing
arrangements can be discriminatory if they have the effect of
precluding other OPZs. 265 This raises an important concern about
the OP provisions contained in the South Korean FTAs because
they clearly reflect the existing manufacturing arrangements, such
as the KIC.266
The debate about the South Korean OP provisions, or any
other OP provisions, is unlikely to be settled by simply relying on
interpretation of the current legal texts because it is clear that the
founders of the WTO either failed to foresee this issue or
intentionally left it unaddressed. Therefore, the debate is likely to
turn into a policy question that is addressed below.
C. Derogation of the Principle of Territoriality
The OP provisions contained in the South Korean FTAs
represent derogation of the principles of territoriality.2 67 Under the
principle, the conditions for the acquisition of originating status
263 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 842-43.
264 See Kim, supra note 154, at 26.
265 See id. at 25.
266 See id. at 25-26.
267 See supra Section III(D).
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must be fulfilled in the free-trade area without interruption.26 8
However, in today's global manufacturing environment, this may
be an unreasonable requirement. Hence, it is worthwhile to
engage in a careful analysis based on the fundamental principles of
international trade law such as economic efficiency,
nondiscrimination, and reciprocity to determine whether it is
desired or necessary to derogate from the principle of territoriality.
Under the principle of economic efficiency, which is often
used as the benchmark for evaluating the merits of international
economic agreements, OP provisions are beneficial because they
represent a greater degree of trade liberalization.26 9 According to
Hirsch, restrictive ROOs are often used as a protectionist tool
because they provide an outlet for releasing the protectionist
pressure in the domestic political environment.27 0 Hence,
restrictive ROOs often serve as substitutes for tariffs.2 7'
The difference between restrictive ROOs and tariffs is that the
producers that are adversely affected by preferential ROOs can
seek to circumvent the rules by replacing inputs that are obstacles
to favorable origin determination with inputs that are acceptable
under the preferential ROOs.2 7 2 This usually means an increase in
production costs because the alternative inputs are likely to be
more expensive than the existing ones.273 However, according to
Krishna, producers will try to comply with preferential ROOs as
long as the benefit of preferential treatment is greater than the cost
of compliance.274 In other words, restrictive ROOs force those
producers that are adversely affected to make business decisions
that are contrary to rational decisions based on the comparative
advantages in the existing economic environment. 2 75 Therefore,
the principle of economic efficiency supports derogation of the
268 Id.
269 See Moshe Hirsch, The Politics of Rules of Origin, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 317, 318 (Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011).
270 See id. at 328.
271 See id.
272 See id. at 326.
273 Id.
274 See Kala Krishna, Understanding Rules of Origin, in THE ORIGIN OF GOODS 19,
22 (Olivier Cadot et al. eds., 2006).
275 See id. at 3-4.
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principle of territoriality. 276 However, economic efficiency is not
the only principle guiding policy makers in international trade.
Nondiscrimination is another fundamental principle in
international trade. The preamble of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement) proclaims
"the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations" as one of the chief objectives of the WTO. 277  The
principle of nondiscrimination is well embedded in the principle of
MFN and the principle of national treatment in Articles I and III of
GATT, respectively.27 8 As discussed above, it is unclear whether
the Article XXIV exemption provides defense against the MFN
violations occurring under OP provisions.2 79 However, the OP
provisions that are either de jure or de facto discriminatory, such
as those contained in the South Korean FTAs, clearly violate the
principle of nondiscrimination.2 80
The principle of reciprocity also governs international trade
relations. The preamble of the WTO Agreement describes
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements" as means
of achieving the objectives of the WTO.28 1 Since OP provisions
extend the benefit of an FTA to countries that are not signatories
to the FTA, they violate the principle of reciprocity. However, the
party conferring the benefits can always waive reciprocity. The
fact that the parties to a particular FTA adopted OP provisions
means they have waived their right to seek reciprocity from the
country in which the OP occurs. It may be argued that countries
should not be allowed to waive reciprocity because such a waiver
may reduce the incentive of the country benefiting from the waiver
to participate in free trade. However, the extent of such an
incentive may not be significant. Also, prohibiting countries from
waiving reciprocity when doing so is economically sensible may
be too much of an infringement on their sovereignty. Therefore,
reciprocity by itself is not a strong argument against derogation of
the principle of territoriality.
276 See id.
277 See GATT, supra note 94, Preamble.
278 See GATT, supra note 94, art. I & III.
279 See Komuro, supra note 174, at 842-43.
280 See id.
281 See GATT, supra note 94, Preamble.
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Finally, consideration must be given to the effect of derogation
of the territoriality principle on international security. For
example, OP provisions may undermine the effect of economic
sanctions imposed against the country in which the OP takes
place.2 82 This is certainly the case in the KIC. There are many
economic sanctions imposed against North Korea by the UN and
individual countries, including the United States and Canada.28 3
During and after the negotiation for KORUS FTA, the question
was raised whether KORUS FTA would constrain the United
States' ability to restrict imports from South Korea or other
countries of goods that contain North Korean inputs.284 However,
such a prospect is highly unlikely because the US embargo applies
not only to finished goods of North Korea but also to goods made
elsewhere with North Korean inputs.285 Therefore, origin
determination has not been found to be determinative in enforcing
the US economic sanctions against North Korea.286  The same
would be true for enforcement of other economic sanctions.
VII. Conclusion
In today's global manufacturing environment, ROOs
governing OP are becoming increasingly important.2 87 However,
scholars have not yet fully explored WTO discipline on
preferential ROOs dealing with OP. The unique political and
economic circumstances surrounding the KIC raise several
interesting and challenging questions, the answers to which would
not only have implication on inter-Korean relations but also on
policies governing international trade generally.288 Despite the
popularity of OP, the existing WTO laws fail to provide adequate
answers to the country-of-origin issues related to OP. 289 This has
led to a proliferation of private arrangements, the legality of which
is questionable. It is time for scholars and policymakers to discuss
282 See supra text accompanying note 54.
283 See id.
284 See CRS KORUS, supra note 30, at 15.
285 Id. at 14-15.
286 Id.
287 See CRS ROOs, supra note 1, at 12.
288 See CRS KIC, supra note 18.
289 See CRS ROOs, supra note 1, at 2-4.
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this important issue and move toward a workable solution.
